‘Condemned forever to becoming and never to being’? The Weise Commission and German Military Isomorphism by Dyson, PTA
 1 
    Condemned Forever to Becoming and Never to Being?1 
            The Weise Commission and German Military Isomorphism 
 
Despite several post-Cold War reforms which have promised far-reaching change, the 
Bundeswehr faces a set of deficits in force structures, capabilities, doctrines and military 
adaptation, which leave it in danger of slipping permanently behind its European partners. The 
study examines the extent to which reforms proposed by the Commission on Structural Reform 
of the Bundeswehr will remedy these deficiencies. It finds that the proposals of the Commission 
include several important measures which will accelerate German convergence with the 
reforms of its European partners. However, the Commission fails to address several 
fundamental problems which impair the Bundeswehr’s capacity to adapt to ongoing operations. 
The article critically engages with the existing theoretical literature on German defence policy 
and highlights the utility of Neoclassical Realism in explaining the process and outcome of 
German defence reform. The study also points to the urgent requirement for further comparative 
scholarship on post-Cold War European military adaptation and civil-military relations in 
defence planning.   
 
Since the end of the Cold War the Bundeswehr has been in a process of almost constant reform. 
Past reforms have promised ‘fundamental renewal’2 and a ‘strictly deployment-orientated 
posture’ 3 . Yet these reforms have delivered only incremental change and in 2011 the 
Bundeswehr suffers from a set of deficits which leave it in danger of slipping permanently 
behind its European partners. These deficiencies have serious implications for the Bundeswehr’s 
interoperability with allies and Germany’s capacity to ‘burden-share’ within the Atlantic 
Alliance and Common Security and Defence Policy. As recent scholarship has demonstrated, 
the difficulties faced by the Bundeswehr in operations in northern Afghanistan4 and the lack of 
participation of the Bundeswehr in the more volatile south of Afghanistan are not only a 
consequence of a lack of willingness among Germany’s political elite to sanction higher-
intensity operations. They also derive from the problems encountered by the Bundeswehr in 
participating in operations which can vary quickly in intensity across the conflict spectrum.5  
This article focuses on the recommendations of the Commission on Structural Reform of 
the Bundeswehr6 and reforms planned by former Defence Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg 
(2009-2011), which have been billed as the most far-reaching structural reforms to the 
Bundeswehr since the end of the Cold War.7 The study examines the extent to which these 
proposed reforms will remedy the deficits faced by the Bundeswehr in 2010. It asks whether 
these reforms represent a Bundeswehr that is about to take a significant step toward convergence 
                                                
1 The title borrows from Karl Scheffler’s quotation that ‘Berlin is a city condemned forever to becoming and never 
to being’. 
2 ‘The Bundeswehr Advancing Steadily into the 21st Century: Cornerstones of a Fundamental Renewal’, BMVg, 
June 2000. 
3 White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr, 2006, BMVg, pt. 3.8, page 65. 
4 On German performance in operations of rapidly-varying intensity, see Janne-Haaland Matlary, European Union 
Security Dynamics (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009), p.151. On Afghanistan, see T. Noetzel and B. Schreer, ‘All the 
Way? The Evolution of German Military Power’, International Affairs 84/2 (2008) pp.211-21. On the impact of 
capability deficits on performance in Afghanistan, see ‘Bundeswehr in Afghanistan bedingt Einsatzbereit’, Welt 
Online, 6 April 2010 http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article7074557/Bundeswehr-in-Afghanistan-bedingt-
einsatzbereit.html, retrieved 2 December 2010. On doctrinal deficiencies see ‘Das ist Naiv Gewesen’, Zeit Online, 
31 July 2009, http://www.zeit.de/2009/32/Kujat-Interview, retrieved 2 December 2010. 
5 T. Dyson, ‘Managing Convergence: German Military Doctrine and Capabilities in the 21st Century’, Defence 
Studies, 11/2 (2011). 
6 Chaired by Frank-Juergen Weise, the Commission on the Structural Reform of the Bundeswehr was established 
by the Cabinet in April 2010 to develop proposals for streamlining the Bundeswehr’s command and administrative 
structures and delivered its report in October 2010. It will, henceforth, be referred to as the ‘Weise Commission’. 
7 S-C. Brune et al, ‘Restructuring Europe’s Armed Forces in Times of Austerity’, SWP Working Paper, November 
2010, p.11.  
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with the British and French armed forces, or a military that is ‘condemned forever to becoming 
and never to being’. 
The study begins by outlining the core premises of the two main theoretical approaches 
to German defence reform: Strategic Culture and Neorealism. The article proceeds by 
examining the outcome of post-Cold War German defence reforms which are disaggregated into 
four categories: force structures, capabilities, doctrine and finally, the institutional structures 
determining the capacity of the military to adapt force structures, capabilities and doctrines to 
ongoing operations. The article then assesses the significance of the recommendations of current 
reform plans for the Bundeswehr’s ability to remedy its deficiencies. It finds that while the 
proposals of the Weise Commission include several important measures which will accelerate 
convergence with the reforms of its European partners, it fails to address several fundamental 
problems which impair the Bundeswehr’s capacity to adapt to ongoing operations. The 
penultimate section of the article takes stock of the implications of the empirical analysis for the 
explanatory power of Cultural and Neorealist approaches to German defence reform. It finds 
that although Neorealism enjoys substantial analytical leverage in capturing the process and 
outcome of German defence reform, it is unable to account for the slow speed with which the 
Bundeswehr is converging with the reforms of its European partners. Hence the section 
demonstrates the utility of Neoclassical Realism in explain the timing of the Bundeswehr’s 
convergence with the dictates of the international security environment. The article concludes by 
focusing on the avenues for future empirical and theoretical research on German and European 
defence reform. 
 
Competing Approaches to the Sources of German Military Change: Strategic Culture 
versus International Structure 
 
The theoretical literature on post-Cold War German defence reform is dominated by cultural 
approaches. These approaches argue that German strategic culture - rooted in the moral and 
military defeat of WW2 and characterised by anti-militarism and a reflexive commitment to 
multilateralism - is an important determinant German defence policy.8 The concept of strategic 
culture emphasises the role played by cognitive paradigms within societies and the key 
institutions of defence and security policy-making in ‘predisposing societies in general and 
political elites in particular to certain actions and policies over others’.9 It is important to note 
that the concept of strategic culture does not posit that policy outcomes will always fully mirror 
German strategic culture. Instead, strategic culture acts to reduce the number of policy responses 
which are deemed appropriate.10 
However, the literature on German strategic culture is divided between scholars who 
view culture as the central independent variable explaining policy outcomes and scholars who 
perceive culture as an intervening variable between the pressures of the international system and 
domestic policy response.11 On the one hand, Berger, Duffield and Maull argue that strategic 
culture forms an intervening variable that mediates, but ultimately succumbs to, pressures from 
the international security environment.12 As Dalgaard-Nielsen notes of these authors: ‘The 
                                                
8 Thomas Berger, Cultures of Anti-Militarism (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1988); Kerry Longhurst, 
Germany and the Use of Force: The Evolution of German Security Policy 1989-2003 (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press), p.16. 
9 John Duffield, World Power Forsaken (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p.27 
10 Duffield, World Power Forsaken, p.27; Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, pp.15-18. 
11 For a comprehensive discussion of the origins of the concept of strategic culture and of theoretical contestation 
within the approach, see A. Johnston, ‘Thinking About Strategic Culture’, International Security 19, no.4 (1995), 
pp.32-64. 
12 Thomas Berger, ‘Norms, Identity and National Security in Germany and Japan’, in Peter Katzenstein (ed.) The 
Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); 
p.328; Duffield, World Power Forsaken, pp.786-90; Hans Maull, ‘Germany’s Foreign Policy post-Kosovo: Still A 
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changes that actually occurred in German security policy over the 1990s are thus conceived of 
as the result of reluctant and reactive adaptation to appease the new international expectations 
directed at Germany’.13 On the other hand, Dalgaard-Nielsen and Longhurst14 emphasise the 
independent impact of German strategic culture in determining the outcome of German defence 
reform.15 Dalgaard-Nielsen and Longhurst posit that Germany strategic culture led to the 
persistence of territorial defence as the core objective of German security policy until 2003, to 
the maintenance of conscription and continues to produce a defence policy that is characterised 
by a preference for multilateral solutions and the use of civilian rather than military 
instruments.16 As Dalgaard-Nielsen notes, while external pressure is an important variable, 
culture forms the central variable: ‘the end-point of change would be a foreign and security 
policy that brings external pressure into balance with the stable and fundamental beliefs that 
make up the core of a country’s security policy culture’.17 
According to Dalgaard-Nielsen and Longhurst, when policy change occurs, it is not so 
much the result of pressure from the international system, but derives predominantly from 
‘within security culture itself’.18 Drawing on Gidden’s ‘Theory of Structuration’, they argue that 
change is dependent upon the ability of actors within the political executive to create culture 
through the control of discourse. Through the use of discursive tools these actors are able to ‘rise 
above the culture they are embedded in and actively manipulate it’. 19  Dalgaard-Nielsen 
emphasises the role of political entrepreneurs in manipulating culture by altering ‘central’ 
‘operational’ and ‘peripheral’ beliefs.20 Longhurst also emphasises the importance of ‘strategic 
cultural agents’ within the political-military elite in re-shaping culture.21 In short, defence policy 
choices are contingent, not so much on objective pressure from the international system, but on 
the subjective values, norms and beliefs of national strategic culture and upon the role of 
individual agency in introducing dynamism to culture.22 The position adopted by Dalgaard-
Nielsen and Longhurst is therefore close to the arguments of the Copenhagen School on 
securitization, which argues that speech acts have the ability to cause, change and found new 
structures of significance in social relations.23  
Neorealism forms the dominant competing approach, but has received relatively little 
attention within the literature.24 Neorealism argues that in a competitive ‘self-help’ international 
system, where military power forms a crucial dimension of relative power,  states are compelled 
                                                                                                                                                      
Civilian Power?’ in Sebastian Harnisch and Hans Maull, Germany as a Civilian Power: The Foreign Policy of the 
Berlin Republic (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), pp.119-20. 
13 Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, Germany, Pacifism and Peace Enforcement (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2006), p.11. 
14 Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, pp.7-8. 
15 Ibid, p.7. 
16 Dalgaard-Nielsen, Germany, Pacifism and Peace Enforcement pp.153-55; Longhurst, Germany and the Use of 
Force.  
17 Dalgaard-Nielsen, Germany, Pacifism and Peace Enforcement p. 144. 
18 Dalgaard-Nielsen, Germany, Pacifism and Peace Enforcement, p.11. 
19 Ibid, p.12. 
20 Central beliefs are ‘abstract beliefs and basic assumptions about the international system. . . rarely questioned and 
stable’; operational beliefs relate to the ‘efficacy of different policy instruments and strategies’; peripheral beliefs 
are ‘more transient and concern concrete issues and objects’. Dalgaard-Nielsen, Germany, Pacifism and Peace-
Enforcement, p. 13. Longhurst terms the three layers of beliefs of which strategic culture are composed 
‘foundational elements,’ ‘security policy standpoints,’ and ‘regulatory practices’. Longhurst, Germany and the Use 
of Force, p.17.  
21 Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, p.21. 
22 Ibid. 
23 T. Balzaq, ‘The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context’, European Journal of 
International Relations 11/2 (2005), pp.171-205; H. Sritzel, ‘Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and 
Beyond’, 13/3 (2007), pp.357-83. 
24 Realist accounts of post-Cold War German defence policy are limited to the Neoclassical Realist analyses. See: 
Dyson, Managing Convergence; Tom Dyson, Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in post-Cold War Europe 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
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to maximise the effectiveness of their military instruments in dealing with conflict scenarios 
which are likely to arise over the short-medium term.25 Neorealism posits that three outcomes 
are possible in defence reform. The first outcome is military innovation: ‘the discovery of new 
knowledge, invention of new practises or their recombination in new forms’. 26  Military 
innovation is, however, associated with a high-level of risk, as should a state pursue faulty 
innovation (that often involves significant financial and intellectual investment) it may lead to a 
dramatic loss of relative power.  
Defence reform may also be guided by emulation: the adoption of ‘best-practice’ in 
military affairs. While Waltz argues that states are predisposed to emulate the military reforms 
of the dominant power in the international system27, states are also keenly attuned to the 
successes and failures of the forces structures, doctrines and capabilities of other states in the 
international system. Hence states emulate not only on the basis of aggregate capabilities, but 
also on the basis of proven success in conflict (military ‘best-practice’), thereby minimising the 
risk and cost of emulation.28 The final possible outcome is policy inertia, whereby a state retains 
increasingly defunct military structures, capabilities and doctrines and suffers a loss in relative 
power. Neorealism expects that states of comparable material power, geographical location and 
size (such as the West European Great Powers) are subject to similar levels of ‘external 
vulnerability’ and will exhibit isomorphic policy responses in military policy, leading to 
convergence in force structures, doctrines and military capability procurement.29 
In summary, Neorealism and the Culturalist approach to defence reform adopted by 
Dalgaard-Nielsen and Longhurst differ in two main ways: on the level of analysis that should 
take priority and on the roles played by material and ideational variables. While Neorealism 
locates causal weight in variables at the systemic level, Dalgaard-Nielsen and Longhurst argue 
that policy is determined by domestic-level variables. Secondly, Neorealism posits that policy is 
determined by an objective reality rooted in the structural imperatives of the balance of power 
that will inevitably lead to military convergence among states of similar material power, size 
and geographical position. However, Dalgaard-Nielsen and Longhurst argue that defence policy 
is dependent upon culturally-subjective interpretations of appropriate policy responses and that 
military convergence should not necessarily be expected.    
The following analysis will test these two approaches. It will demonstrate that rather than 
acting according to the dictates of the subjective beliefs of strategic culture, German defence 
reform is gradually beginning to mirror objective military ‘best-practice’ and is converging with 
the reforms of Britain and France. The article will highlight how the experiences of conflict in 
Afghanistan and pressure to conform to military ‘best-practice’ have fostered a modest 
acceleration of military isomorphism through several of the Weise Commission’s proposals. 
These proposals will improve the Bundeswehr’s capacity to adapt force structures, doctrines and 
capabilities to the changing operational environment.     
 
The Bundeswehr in Comparative Perspective: Delayed and Reactive Reform 
 
During the post-Cold War era, German defence reforms have increasingly embodied a partial 
and selective emulation of the force structures, doctrines and capabilities associated with the 
US-led Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). The RMA is composed of three core features. 
Firstly, the development of expeditionary forces characterised by joint command structures.30 
Secondly, a shift from weapons platforms to knowledge-empowered networked forces capable 
                                                
25 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA, Addison Wesley, 1979), p.127 
26 Joao Resende-Santos, Neorealism, the State and the Modern Mass Army (Cambridge: CUP, 2007), p. 72. 
27 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p.127. 
28 Military ‘best-practice’ is identified through the observation of the experiences of other states and through a 
state’s own operational experiences. Resende-Santos, Neorealism the State and the Modern Mass Army, p.58-61. 
29 Dyson, Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in post-Cold War Europe, pp.95-106. 
30 K. Reynolds, ‘Building the Future Force’, Contemporary Security Policy 27/3 (2006), p.458. 
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of exercising agility and precision in the application of attritional force (Network-Centric 
Warfare (NCW)).31 Effects Based Operations (EBO) has taken centre-stage in conceptual 
development on NCW and formed, until 2006, the third key feature of US transformation.32 
EBO involve the use of networked activities and the mobilisation of all sources of national 
power (political, economic, military and diplomatic) to achieve first-, second- and third-order 
strategic effects against near-peer competitors.33 While the RMA remains important, there has, 
since 2006 been a much stronger focus on the concepts and capabilities necessary to conduct 
complex land operations ‘amongst the people’. Key changes include doctrinal development, 
notably the 2006 US Army/Marines Counterinsurgency (COIN) Doctrine Field Manual that 
emphasises the centrality of a population-focused approach to operations and institution 
building.34 EBO were also stripped from US Joint Doctrine in 2008. Furthermore, the 2009 US 
defence budget cancelled several RMA programmes in favour of capabilities more suitable for 
irregular conflict.35 
German emulation of the RMA has involved three main features. Firstly, improving the 
jointness36 of the Bundeswehr and its deployability and interoperability with Alliance partners 
through reforms to command structures. Secondly, a shift away from the procurement of 
platform-based weapon systems to investment in Command, Control, Intelligence, Surveillance 
and Reconnaissance (C2ISR) capabilities in support of networked operations and investment in 
the capabilities required to project power within and outside of Europe’s geopolitical 
neighbourhood. The final pillar of German reform has involved doctrinal development that has 
focused on the development of thinking on the networking of forces and the implications of 
C2ISR capabilities for Command and Control. Germany has also made progress on doctrinal 
development around the Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) and on 
Stabilisation/COIN doctrine. In this regard German defence reforms represent a case of 
convergence with those of its closest European partners, the British and French, whose reforms 
have also been characterised by a similar selective emulation of the RMA.37 
However, German emulation of the RMA and its convergence with the reforms of the 
other European Great Powers has been painfully slow. It was only in 2003 with the release of 
the Defence Policy Guidelines (VPR) that Germany abandoned territorial defence in favour of 
expeditionary crisis-management as the core objective of defence policy.38 Such a delay in 
reform to the objectives of German defence policy was particularly remarkable when one 
considers that the formal shift from territorial defence to a focus on expeditionary crisis-
management was taken by the French in their defence reforms of 1994 and by the British in the 
Strategic Defence Review (SDR) of 1997/98.39 The temporal delay in reform to the core 
objectives of German defence policy has had important implications for the Bundeswehr’s 
ability to undertake expeditionary operations on the scale and intensity of its European partners 
and has led to a delayed emulation of the RMA compared to Britain and France, as the 
following section will highlight. 
 
Deficits in Force Structures  
                                                
31 E. Dahl, ‘NCW and the Death of Operational Art’, Defence Studies 2/1 (2002), p.5. 
32 T. Farrell, ‘The Dynamics of British Military Transformation’, International Affairs 84/4 (2008), p.779 
33 Ibid.  
34 B Hauser, ‘The Cultural Revolution in COIN’, Journal of Strategic Studies 30/1 (2006), p.167. 
35  ‘Military Budget Reflects a Shift in Strategy’, New York Times, 6 April 2009. See: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/07/us/politics/07defense.html?pagewanted= 
1&_r=2&hp, retrieved 30 November 2010. 
36 Jointness refers to the principle of inter-service cooperation in the conduct and planning of operations, capability 
procurement, doctrinal development and concept development and experimentation (CD&E). 
37 On the European Great Powers’ selective emulation of the RMA see Tom Dyson, Neoclassical Realism and 
Defence Reform in post-Cold War Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp.28-60. 
38 Ibid, p.122-13. 
39 B. Irondelle, ‘Civil-Military Relations and the End of Conscription in France’, Security Studies 12/3 (2003), 
p.162; C. McInnes, ‘Labour’s Strategic Defence Review’, International Affairs 74/4 (1998), pp.833-36. 
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The shift toward jointness and interoperability in command structures took place at a relatively 
early stage in the post-Cold War era in the UK. In 1996 the UK established the Permanent Joint 
Headquarters that draws together intelligence, logistics, planning and operational staffs and 
contains a rapidly-deployable in-theatre joint HQ. These changes were codified by the 1997/98 
SDR that placed jointness and interoperability at the heart of force planning.40 Similarly, French 
command structures were reconfigured according to the principle of modularity following the 
1996 structural reforms.41  However, the principles of jointness and interoperability have only 
taken centre-stage in German defence reform since the turn of the century, particularly 
following the 2003 VPR. An important step toward jointness was taken in 2001 with the 
establishment of the Operations Command in Potsdam that is responsible for coordinating all 
overseas deployments and through the initiation of the Response Forces Operations Command 
that provides a deployable force headquarters. The 2006 Defence White Paper (DWP) also 
created of a 35,000-strong rapid-reaction force designed for the higher-intensity ‘initial-entry’ 
stages of operations and a 75,000-strong stabilisation force, designed for low-medium intensity 
stabilisation/post-conflict reconstruction operations.42 These forces were intended to deliver the 
capacity to field 14,000 expeditionary combat troops.43  
However, significant problems remain in German force structures. While the 
development of joint forces is an important step forward, the separation between forces suitable 
for high and low-medium intensity conflict does not reflect contemporary Stabilisation/COIN 
operations, in which land forces require the capability to deal with conflict that can vary in 
intensity at short notice. Furthermore, while the French abolished conscription in 1996, 55,000 
basic and extended-service conscripts currently serve in the German military for a period of six 
months.44 Not only are basic-service conscripts unavailable for deployment, but they also tie up 
valuable personnel and resources in training and accommodation, undermining the 
Bundeswehr’s deployability and the pace of its transformation.45 Furthermore, although the 
2006 DWP outlined the intention of developing the capacity to deploy 14,000 troops abroad 
(from a total force of 245,000) in support of complex crisis-management operations, the 8,300 
troops currently deployed abroad have left the Bundeswehr operating at the limits of its 
capability.46   
In contrast, the planning assumptions of the UK’s 2010 Strategic Defence and Security 
Review (SDSR) outline the intention to generate (from 154,000 troops) a one-off intervention 
force of 30,000.47 Alternatively, the SDSR envisages the capability to simultaneously undertake 
an enduring (more than six months) stabilisation operation of 6,500, a non-enduring (less than 
six months) complex intervention of up to 2,000 personnel and a non-enduring simple 
intervention of up to 1,000 troops.48 French defence planning assumptions outline the capacity 
(from 225,000 troops) to simultaneously deploy up to 30,000 troops in a major expeditionary 
operation within a period of six months and for up to one year, in addition to a 5,000 strong 
reserve on permanent operational alert.49  
 
Deficits in Military Capabilities 
 
                                                
40 McInnes, ‘Labour’s Strategic Defence Review’, p.837. 
41 G. Bloch, ‘French Military Reform: Lessons for America’s Army?’ Parameters: US Army War College 
Quarterly 30/2 (2000), p.36. 
42 White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr’, BMVg, 2006, pt.3.9, p.69. 
43 Ibid. pt.3.8, p.67. 
44 Ibid. pt. 7.2, p.116.  
45 Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security, p.64. 
46 Brune et al, ‘The German Armed Forces and the Financial Crisis’, p.2. 
47 ‘Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The SDSR’, HMSO, 2010, pt. 2.15, p.19. 
48 Ibid. 
49 ‘The French White Paper on National Security’, Odilie Jacob, 2008, p.11. 
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The 2003 VPR set several key priorities in capability procurement, notably command and 
control, intelligence collection and reconnaissance, strategic and tactical mobility, effective 
engagement, support and sustainability, and survivability and protection.50 Germany has made 
some progress in these areas, including the Infantryman of the Future system that will equip 
frontline infantry units with state-of-the-art equipment designed to improve lethality, 
survivability, mobility and command and control capabilities.51 Other key acquisitions include 
53 Airbus A-400M transport aircraft which will enhance strategic mobility and the 
strengthening of tactical mobility through the acquisition of 134 NH-90 transport helicopters 
and modernisation of 40 CH-53 transport helicopters. Effective engagement is being addressed 
through the acquisition of 80 Tiger multi-role combat support helicopters and PUMA infantry 
fighting vehicles.52  Since the late 1990s there has also been significant investment in C2ISR 
capabilities, including the procurement of joint, networkable radio equipment and other tactical 
communications capabilities as well as a joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
network.53            
 Despite these investments, Germany lies behind its European partners in the procurement 
of capabilities in support of networking. While UK forces attained an initial network-enabled 
capability in 2007, Germany will not reach a comparable stage until 2013.54 Germany’s 
expeditionary capabilities are also undermined by time delays and budget over-runs associated 
with key procurement programmes in support of tactical and strategic airlift, including the NH-
90 helicopters and A-400M transport aircraft. Of the 80 Tiger helicopters ordered by the Army 
(which were planned for service in 1992) only 10 have been delivered, beginning in 2006. The 
Eurofighter has also suffered significant delays since the project’s inception in 1979 and cost 
over-runs have left Germany struggling to finance the purchase of the final 37 of its 177 
Eurofighters.55   
Delays in procurement are compounded by the commitment to ensuring maximum 
performance from capabilities, rather than pursuing the cheaper and quicker option of sacrificing 
10-20 percent of performance.56 The German Defence Ministry (BMVg) has, more recently, 
been considering implementing a ‘spiral development model’ to allow the formal consideration 
of introducing a capability at less than 100 percent of its potential from an early stage of project 
development.57 The introduction of this model will, however, have little immediate impact on 
ongoing programmes. Moreover, Germany remains committed to several defence capability 
procurement programmes which have more relevance to Cold War conflict scenarios. Such 
projects include the 2005/06 acquisition of eight P3-C Orion anti-submarine warfare aircraft and 
the procurement of two U-212 submarines in 2005-06. Seen in the context of Germany’s low 
defence spending in comparison to Britain and France, whose higher-level of spending allows 
them to hedge against a broader range of less-likely future conflict scenarios, such as classic 
major combat operations, these projects are an expensive luxury.58 Furthermore, the 2007 
ordering of four F-125-Class expeditionary frigates is excessive, considering that their utility is 
questionable given the likelihood of land-based expeditionary crisis-management operations 
characterising short-medium term conflict scenarios.59 
                                                
50 ‘Defence Policy Guidelines’, BMVg, 2003, pt. 15, section 2. 
51 Dyson, Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in post-Cold War Europe, p.53. 
52 H. Matzken, ‘German Army Stabilisation Forces’ Doctrine 12 (2007), pp.71-4.  
53 Dyson, ‘Managing Convergence’. 
54 Interviews, BMVg, Bonn, 12 October 2009. 
55 ‘Bundeswehr Reviews its Entire Structure’, Defence News, 20 September, 2010. 
56 Brune et al, ‘The German Armed Forces and the Financial Crisis’, SWP Comments, May 2010, p.3. 
57 Interview, BMVg, Berlin, 24 November 2009. 
58 In 2008 British defence spending totalled $60,499 billion; French defence spending totalled $66,180 billion, 
while German defence spending was $46,241 billion. ‘Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence’, 
NATO Public Diplomacy Division, February 2009. On German capability acquisition see:  Dyson, ‘Managing 
Convergence’. 
59 ‘Bundeswehr Reviews its Entire Structure’, Defense News, 20 September 2010, p.18. 
 8 
 
Deficits in Doctrine 
 
German doctrinal development also lags behind that of its European partners. British and French 
thinking on EBO has undergone significant development since 2003. Both countries have 
converged around the ‘Effects Based Approach to Operations’ (EBAO) that recognises that it is 
not the nature of operations themselves which have changed, but the approach to operations.60 
British and French EBAO emphasises the importance of delivering both kinetic and non-kinetic 
effects and has been firmly located within the Comprehensive Approach that seeks to integrate 
other governmental departments, international organisations and actors from civil society into 
campaign planning and execution. As British and French thinking on EBAO already recognised 
some of the pitfalls associated with EBO (not least its emphasis on kinetic effects and highly-
centralised command structures) the decline of EBO has not had such far-reaching implications 
for these states. EBO’s decline has led to a focus on the looser notion of ‘effects-based thinking’ 
that shuns the more deterministic dimensions of EBAO, by retaining its utility in targeting 
closed systems and networks and provide a language of effects to assist in campaign planning 
and execution.61  
In contrast, the Bundeswehr’s conceptual development on EBAO did not take off until 
2006 and lags behind that of the UK and France. Thinking on EBAO is differentiated within the 
Bundeswehr. While the Air Force champions a more traditional understanding of EBO62, the 
Army is receptive only to the looser concept of ‘effects-based thinking’. 63  Furthermore, 
Germany is awaiting NATO guidance on the implications of the decline of EBO for doctrinal 
development.64 German thinking about the implications of networked capabilities for military 
doctrine is hampered by the slow pace of C2ISR capability procurement. Hence Germany is 
currently engaging with the implications of new C2 capabilities for command structures and 
joint multinational operations through a series of military exercises; a process that took place 
several years previously in Britain and France.65  
Finally, Germany also suffers from significant doctrinal deficits in Stabilisation and 
COIN. UK and French military doctrine exhibits a strong level of dynamism and delivers a 
detailed account of how to undertake Stabilisation and COIN operations.66 By 1997 British and 
French army doctrine recognised the tendency for expeditionary crisis-management operations 
to be characterised by conflict of rapidly-varying intensity.67 However, until its revision in 2007 
German Army doctrine (Truppenfuehrung von Landstreitkraeften) separated fighting, peace-
support and humanitarian aid as distinct conflict categories.68 German doctrine was updated in 
2005 to include Guidelines for Operations against Irregular Forces, but it failed to properly 
integrate the kinetic and non-kinetic dimensions of military operations.69 Hence the Bundeswehr 
lacks a comprehensive COIN doctrine suitable for the kind of operations the Bundeswehr has 
encountered in the north of Afghanistan. However an explicit COIN doctrine is now under 
                                                
60 On British EBAO, see T. Farrell, ‘The Dynamics of British Military Transformation’, International Affairs 84/4 
(2008), pp.790-98; On French EBAO, see Tom Dyson, Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in post-Cold 
War Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010), pp.41-7 and S. Rynning, ‘Transformation and Counter-Transformation 
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development.70 Furthermore, German rules of engagement under ISAF and pre-deployment 
training have increasingly focused on a more robust approach and the effective integration of 
kinetic and non-kinetic effects.71 In summary, German doctrinal development is highly-reactive 
to developments in NATO and displays a strong degree of inertia.  
 
Deficits in Military Adaptability 
 
The Bundeswehr also suffers from deficits which impair its ability to identify military ‘best-
practice’ from its own operational experiences and from the experiences of other states. As a 
consequence the Bundeswehr has encountered difficulties in adapting force structures, doctrine 
and capabilities to the changing operational environment in Afghanistan.  
The process of ‘bottom-up’ military adaptation has been hampered by the delay in 
developing a formalised process of lesson evaluation and implementation following military 
operations (the so-called ‘lessons-learned process’). The British and French adopted a digitised 
lessons-learned system in the late 1990s. Yet it was only in 2004 that Germany established an IT 
system in support of lessons-learned (InfoSysEEBw) at the Bundeswehr Operations Command.72 
The Operations Command acts as a ‘service agnostic’ institution coordinating lesson 
identification and implementation, deciding which service should take the lead on the analysis 
of an issue and, through InfoSysEEBw, checking follow-up. 73  The 2008 creation of the 
Operational Staff and its section for Operational Assessment has also played an important role 
in enhancing the Bundeswehr’s capacity to adapt doctrine and capabilities to the operational 
environment by allowing the military to more fully exploit the potential of InfoSysEEBw.74 The 
work of the Operational Staff has been supplemented by the Bundeswehr’s Institute of Social 
Sciences that, on behalf of the Operational Staff, prepares questionnaires for commanders to be 
completed before, during and after deployment and that also organises workshops for 
commanders returning from operation. 75  The 2004 establishment of the Bundeswehr 
Transformation Centre (BTC) as a ‘think tank’ on issues of force structures, doctrine, military 
capabilities and concept development and experimentation (CD&E) has also bolstered the 
Bundeswehr’s capacity to identify military ‘best-practice’. 
Nevertheless, several fundamental problems remain in the German process of doctrinal 
development and capability acquisition, which undermine the Bundeswehr’s ability to identify 
and implement lessons from operational experience and from the observation Alliance partners’ 
experiences. Firstly, despite the prominent role of the Leadership Academy’s Working Group on 
Joint and Combined Operations, Germany lacks a central body like the UK’s DCDC and 
France’s Centre for Concept Development, Doctrine and Experimentation (CICDE) that can 
take a lead role in the development of joint military doctrine.76 The implementation of doctrinal 
change involve a complex process of consultation that reduces the Bundeswehr’s ability to 
decisively respond to challenges in the operational environment and slows the speed with which 
changes are integrated into pre-deployment training.77 Furthermore, the identification of lessons-
learned in the comprehensive approach has been undermined by poor communication between 
the Foreign Office (a key partner in ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Teams) and BMVg 
following operations. However, proposals are currently under consideration to formalise Foreign 
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Office briefings to the BMVg to help the military ensure that doctrine fully supports cross-
government cooperation.78 
Secondly, in contrast to the UK and France, where the military is permitted a significant 
level of autonomy in doctrinal development and implementation, German military doctrine is 
subject to strong civilian control.79 The Bundestag enjoys constitutionally-mandated powers 
over operational issues, including rules of engagement, command and control and risk-
assessment.80 In contrast, the oversight powers of the UK Parliament extend only to the approval 
of a mission’s mandate and the right to visit troops on deployment, while the French National 
Assembly enjoys the right to vote on troop deployments, but only four months after the 
initiation of an operation.81 The high-level of Bundestag control has been matched by a close 
preoccupation of the core executive and civilian leadership of the BMVg with doctrinal 
development and tactical and operational issues.82 Strong civilian control not only complicates 
the process of doctrinal development, but also allows party-political concerns to cloud decision-
making on doctrine at the tactical and operational levels, fostering a significant degree of 
doctrinal stagnation.83 This stagnation has been evident in the development of an explicit 
German COIN doctrine that has proved a particularly sensitive political issue.84 
Thirdly, German military doctrine remains classified and doctrinal development is 
surrounded by a culture of secrecy. Not only does classification make doctrine unavailable to 
Reservists, but it also places limitations on the extent to which the military is able to call upon 
expertise from academia and civil society.85 Furthermore, despite the steps taken by the BTC to 
foster a more open environment to doctrinal and conceptual development within the 
Bundeswehr, it has been less successful in engaging with external actors.86  
The final major impediment to adaptability lies in deficits in the process of defence 
capability acquisition. Like the UK and France, Germany has introduced an ‘Urgent Operational 
Requirements’ (UOR) scheme allows the acquisition of equipment for ongoing operations. The 
scheme allows the Services to procure equipment ‘off the shelf’ that costs less than €5 Million 
and must be deployed within 12 months.87 The scheme has, for example, allowed the military to 
lease Heron 1 long-range endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles from Israel and acquire 
Reccelight tactical reconnaissance pods and groundwork stations for its Tornados.88 Yet German 
troops continue to suffer from deficits in key areas such as force protection, for example only 70 
percent of German vehicles in Afghanistan enjoy mine protection (Brune, 2010: 3) Indeed, the 
German UOR scheme is much more limited than that of the UK.89 Financed by Treasury 
contingency funding, UK UORs are not subject to budgetary restrictions.90 The scheme has 
enabled investment in Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance and in particular, in force 
protection, financing, for example, an outlay of £250 Million on 400 new Ridgeback and 
Mastiff fighting vehicles.91 
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Furthermore, it is very difficult for the Bundeswehr to push through changes to the 
formal equipment programme following the identification of serious UORs with broader 
implications for ongoing procurement programmes. These difficulties derive from three key 
deficits in the process of capability acquisition. Firstly, poor management of the relationship 
between the BMVg and German and European defence industries has led to insufficient 
mechanisms to sanction manufacturers for late delivery. This has contributed to significant time 
delays and cost-over-runs in key projects, particularly cooperative projects at the European level, 
such as A-400M, Eurofighter and the Tiger Helicopters.92 Political considerations, including 
state investment in EADS and the negative consequences for Europe’s defence industry should 
states cancel their orders, have undermined the capacity of European states to hold EADS to 
account for the late delivery of the Tiger and A-400M programmes.93  
Secondly, the structuring of military input to defence planning on capability acquisition 
also undermines the responsiveness of the acquisition programme. The key organs responsible 
for taking decisions on changes to the Bundeswehr’s acquisition programme are dominated by 
military input. These organs include the Integrated Working Group for Capability Analysis (that 
is responsible for translating the broader direction on capabilities provided by the 2006 DWP 
and Coordination Group for Transformation into major decisions on force structures, doctrine 
and capability procurement) and the Military Advisory Board (that has ultimate decision-making 
authority on major changes to projects).94 Furthermore, the Single Service Chiefs are not 
subordinated to the Generalinspekteur. Consequently the individual Service Chiefs can trade-off 
support for their key projects, thereby promoting inertia in the capability programme.95 
Finally, the performance of the German procurement programme is undermined by the 
weak role of the German Federal Auditing Office (BRH). While the BRH is mandated to 
oversee procurement, it is only able to devote a small pool of manpower to the task.96 
Furthermore, although the Bundestag enjoys the power to approve projects costing over €25 
million, its capacity to hold the Defence Minister to account for delays and cost over-runs is 
limited. The culture of secrecy surrounding German defence policy is not only an impediment to 
doctrinal adaptation, but also undermines the ability of actors from civil society and other organs 
of Government to hold the Bundeswehr to account in the mismanagement of defence capability 
acquisition. There is no information available in the public realm from either the BRH or the 
Bundeswehr’s Armaments Division on time-slippages and budget over-runs on major defence 
capability procurement programmes 
However, poor civilian oversight of defence planning is not confined to Germany. The 
October 2009 Independent Review of Acquisition conducted by Bernard Gray points to 
significant deficiencies in UK procurement, concluding that the costs of programmes are on 
average 40 percent greater than planned and delivered 80 percent later than estimated.97 The 
report emphasises the urgent need to reform the acquisition process to allow civilian actors to 
exert greater control over the Services’ procurement plans. 98  Combined with the poor 
management of relations with industry, these deficits in the structuring of military input to 
defence planning in the UK have reduced the responsiveness of the procurement programme to 
ongoing operations by leaving a black hole of £36 Billion at the heart of the UK defence 
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budget.99 Consequently, while the UK’s UOR scheme has allowed improvements in force 
protection and ISR, Britain has found it very difficult to deliver urgently-needed Chinook 
helicopters in support of tactical manoeuvrability in Afghanistan (of which there are only 8-10 
on deployment).100 While a decision was taken in December 2009 to provide an extra 22 
Chinooks funded through base closures, cuts to the Nimrod and Tornado fleets and a reduction 
of 7,500 civilian BMVg staff, the order was reduced to 12 by the SDSR.101  
France, in contrast, enjoys a more efficient system of defence procurement. The French 
acquisition programme suffers from an average delay of only 1.5 months per year, compared to 
the average delay of 6 months per year in the UK and is also subject to lower cost over-runs that 
the UK and Germany.102 In contrast to Germany and the UK, decision making on capability 
acquisition is highly-centralised and streamlined. Three staff work under the direct authority of 
the Defence Minister on capability acquisition: the Chief of the Defence Staff, the Chief 
Executive of the French Armaments Agency (DGA) and the General Secretary of the 
Administration.103 The French Defence Minister takes full responsibility for project delivery that 
is coordinated through the Ministerial Investment Board (MIB). While the Single Services are 
represented on the MIB, the Minister must balance the Services’ competing perspectives.104 
Furthermore, in contrast to the Bundeswehr’s Armaments Division and UK’s Defence 
Equipment and Support, the DGA is composed of civilian technical experts and is therefore able 
to provide more objective support to the Minister.105 Finally, in contrast to the UK and Germany, 
the National Assembly enjoys strong oversight powers on the defence budget through the 
Military Programme Law that establishes the military budget and major capability investment 
projects over a six year period and the Defence Minister must provide annual reports to 
Parliament on the cost, timing and performance of projects.106  
  
The Weise Commission: Gradually Accelerating Convergence 
 
In April 2010 the Wesie Commission was established by German Cabinet with the remit of 
streamlining Bundeswehr command and administrative structures in advance of what has been 
touted as the most far-reaching reform of the Bundeswehr since the end of the Cold War. This 
reform process has been precipitated by two main pressures. Firstly, the austerity measures of 
the Finance Ministry that, in early 2010, set the BMVg the task of reducing its budget by €8.3 
Billion between 2011-14. 107  Secondly, by a realisation spurred by the experiences of 
deployment in Afghanistan, of the need to address some of the deficits in German force 
structures, capabilities and doctrines identified in the first section of this article, in order to 
ensure the Bundeswehr’s relevance in expeditionary operations of rapidly-varying intensity.108  
The Commission’s report was delivered in October 2010. On 7 February 2011, the 
BMVg State Secretary, Walther Otremba, supported by the Working Group on the Restructuring 
of the Bundeswehr, submitted proposals for reform of BMVg command and administrative 
structures based closely upon the Commission’s recommendations. These proposals were 
                                                
99  ‘Defence Budget facing 36 Billion Black Hole Say MPs’, Guardian, 23 March 2010, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/mar/23/defence-spending-36-billion-blackhole, retrieved 29 November, 
2010. 
100  ‘MoD Forced to Hire Civilian Helicopters in Afghanistan’, Independent, 15 October 2006, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/mod-forced-to-hire-civilian-helicopters-in-afghanistan-420161.html, 
retrieved 29 November 2010. 
101 ‘Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The SDSR’, HMSO, 2010, p.4. 
102 Review of Acquisition for the Secretary of State for Defence’, p.215, 
103 Dyson, Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in post-Cold War Europe, pp.158-59. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid. 
107 ‘Bundeswehr Reviews its Entire Structure’, Defense News, 20 September 2010, p.18. 
108 Interview, BMVg, Berlin, 23 November 2010. 
 13 
intended to form the key tenets of zu Guttenberg’s final reform package.109 However, the reform 
process has temporarily stalled following the resignation of zu Guttenberg on 1 March 2011. 
The new Defence Minister, Thomas de Maziere, immediately relieved Otremba of his position 
and outlined his intention to ‘thoroughly assess’ zu Guttenberg’s plans. The Weise 
Commission’s Report remains, therefore, the likeliest basis for the future reform agenda and, as 
a consequence, is the focus of this section.110  
The Report addresses in particular changes to force structures, command structures and 
the capability procurement process and goes some way to addressing the Bundeswehr’s deficits. 
It contains two key recommendations for reforms to German force structures. Crucially, the 
Commission proposes a reduction of the Bundeswehr to between 180,000 and 185,000 troops, 
the suspension of conscription and the introduction of a voluntary, up to 23 month, civil-service 
that will enable young people to undertake either community service or serve in the Bundeswehr 
(a maximum of 15,000 posts in the Bundeswehr).111 A 15-month minimum service period will 
allow recruits to undergo the necessary training to serve on overseas missions.112 By freeing-up 
vital funds for investment in deployability and increasing the proportion of troops available for 
deployment from around to 15,000, the abolition of conscription is a critical step in furnishing 
Germany with the professional forces necessary for complex crisis-management operations.113 
Secondly, in recognition of the increasing tendency of operations to vary in intensity, the 
Commission proposes the abolition of the separation between attack, stabilisation and support 
forces which it notes ‘have brought no benefit in our capacity to undertake operations’.114 This 
is an important step toward the creation of a Bundeswehr that will be capable of conducting 
operations of rapidly-varying intensity. 
The Commission also proposes significant reforms to command structures to reduce their 
complexity and enhance the efficiency of operational leadership. Firstly, the report proposes 
strengthening the role of the Generalinspekteur (General Inspector) who will now take ultimate 
responsibility for all aspects of the planning, preparation, leadership and follow-up of military 
operations.115 Furthermore, the Commission points to the need to reduce the levels of hierarchy 
across all sections of the Bundeswehr in order to increase the transparency, simplicity and speed 
of decision-making processes.116 The Commission also suggests measures to avoid overlapping 
responsibilities between the Services by bringing together the civil and military sections of the 
Ministry on the basis of function, through a reduction of the ministry from 3,000 to 1,500 posts 
and moving all sections of the BMVg to Berlin, thereby reducing the number of departments in 
the Ministry by seven.117 The simplified Ministerial structures will see a Generalinspekteur 
served by eight Departments: Strategy and Planning; Deployment; 
Structure/Organisation/Training; Support; Personnel; Material; Budget and Accounting. In order 
to reduce the complexity of operational leadership, the Commission also recommends reducing 
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the role of the Services’ leadership commands in international and national operations by further 
strengthening the Operations Command in Potsdam.118      
 If enacted, these reforms to command structures will not only deliver important savings, 
but will enhance the Bundeswehr’s deployability by simplifying operational leadership and 
reducing duplication. These changes to command structures have been welcomed by key figures 
within the Bundeswehr responsible for coordinating the ‘lessons-learned’ process as an 
important step in enhancing the implementation of lessons-learned, due to the reduction in the 
number of veto-points to enacting change.119 Proposals are also under consideration to bring 
together the work of the Bundeswehr’s Leadership Academy, Bundeswehr Universities in 
Hamburg and Munich, the Centre for Inner Leadership in Koblenz, Institute for German 
Military History in Potsdam and BTC to create a single Defence Academy.120 If enacted, this 
restructuring will streamline the analysis and follow up of lessons-learned and the identification 
of ‘best-practice’ from observation of the experiences of Alliance partners.  
However, the recommendations of the Commission on reforms to German command 
structures do not engage with several of the fundamental problems which beset doctrinal 
development. Firstly, without an organisation like the CICDE and DCDC that has the power to 
take a lead role on joint doctrine, these changes will deliver only partial improvements to 
doctrinal adaptability. The Commission is also silent on problem of excessive civilian 
interference in doctrinal development that has, at times, fostered inertia in doctrinal 
development, as evidenced by the slow development of an explicit COIN doctrine. Finally, the 
Commission fails to address the lack of openness to critical reflection in the Bundeswehr that 
derives from the classification of doctrine.  
 The Commission also makes several recommendations for changes to the process of 
German capability procurement. The first central proposal is the development of a defence 
industrial strategy that will allow the BMVg and German and European defence industries to 
undertake long-term planning.121 The Commission also proposes reform of the Procurement 
Organisation into an Agency for Bundeswehr Procurement and the creation of a central 
purchasing organisation to foster a clear delineation of responsibility in acquisition by 
abolishing the overlapping structures of the BMVg’s Armaments Division, Federal Office of 
Defence Technology and Procurement and the IT Division.122 Furthermore, the Commission 
recommends an optimisation of the procurement process, including an avoidance of maximalist 
project specifications and the use of off-the-shelf technology wherever possible to avoid the 
complexities associated with new projects.123  
In addition, on 25 June 2010 a BMVg list of priority cuts to ongoing projects was leaked 
that seeks to deliver savings of €9.3 billion. These cuts include a reduction of the number of 
NH-90 helicopters from 122 to 80, a reduction of the Tiger Attack Helicopter from 80 to 40, a 
cancellation or sale on the open market of the remaining 37 Eurofighters and a reduction of the 
number of PUMA fighting vehicles from 400 to 280.124 It has also been suggested that the 
Bundeswehr will sell off 13 of its A-400M planes, leaving it with 40 of the military transport 
aircraft.125 While cutting the number of Eurofighters is a welcome move, the reduction of A-
400M, NH-90, Tiger attack helicopters and PUMA armoured vehicles, represent significant cuts 
to capabilities of use to expeditionary full-spectrum land-based operations, which form the 
likeliest conflict scenarios for the Bundeswehr over the short-medium term. The Navy also faces 
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potential reductions in the number of frigates (from 15 to 12) through the retirement of three 
F122 Frigates.126 
 The Commission’s proposals on capability procurement, if enacted, will go some way to 
creating a less bureaucratic and more streamlined process of acquisition by simplifying BMVg 
decision-making process, focusing on off-the-shelf capabilities and clarifying the Bundeswehr’s 
requirements from the German and European defence industries. They do not, however, alter 
some of the fundamental problems which best the process of defence capability acquisition and 
reduce its responsiveness to the requirements of current missions. Firstly, unlike the Gray 
Review, the Commission does not explicitly recognise the negative impact of inter-service 
rivalry on procurement and fails to outline stronger mechanisms which will allow civilian policy 
makers to exert greater ‘top-down’ control over acquisition. Furthermore, in contrast to the high-
level of civilian control exhibited by the French procurement process, the Commission also fails 
to strengthen the capacity of external actors, such as the Bundestag and BRH to hold the BMVg 
to account for time slippages and cost-over-runs. Moreover, while the Commission recognises 
the need focus on off-the-shelf solutions and acknowledges the necessity for a fundamental 
change in cooperation between the Bundeswehr and industry, it does not propose specific 
measures which will allow the BMVg to exert greater control over industry in the case that 
projects are not delivered on time and to cost. Finally, the Commission can do little to alter the 
broader problem of the structural political power of the German defence industry. This problem 
derives from the power of individual Laender and German defence industry which reduce the 
willingness of the core executive to cancel or alter major projects with implications for 
significant German job losses.  
 The appointment of de Maziere provides an excellent opportunity to address some of the 
weaknesses in Weise Report. However, the new Defence Minister faces two further challenges. 
Firstly, de Maziere must convince the Finance Ministry and colleagues in the Cabinet of the 
need to provide sufficient finances for the reform. Despite the savings associated with the 
abolition of conscription, defence planners at the BMVg estimate that a professional 
Bundeswehr of 185,000 troops will require an extra €1.5 billion per year.127 De Maziere also 
faces difficult decisions about the allocation of personnel numbers to the services and will have 
to make tough decisions on cuts to key capability programmes.128 It is therefore vital that de 
Maziere uses the first months of his appointment to develop an explicit German National 
Security Strategy (NSS). The reform plans of zu Guttenberg came under fire from commentators, 
for undertaking a process of ‘strategy formulation backwards’ and were strongly criticised by 
the Chairwoman of the Bundestag’s Defence Committee, Susanne Kastner, for placing the ‘cart 
before the horse’.129 The 2006 Defence White Paper is becoming increasingly outdated as a 
guideline for Bundeswehr reform and also offers thin guidance on the prioritisation of security 
threats and risks. A NSS would facilitate a more rational prioritisation of defence capability 
investment and allocation of ‘troops-to-task’ by providing unequivocal guidance to the Services 
on the strategic direction of reform. Furthermore, a public debate on the Bundeswehr’s role in 
the contemporary security environment would help establish a solid foundation of public 
support for Bundeswehr reform and assist in securing the financing and implementation of far-
reaching reform.    
 
Neoclassical Realism and the Timing of German Defence Reform: Culture as an 
Intervening Variable? 
 
Germany’s partial and selective emulation of the RMA provides compelling evidence that 
Germany is acting according to the material forces of the international system, rather than 
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subjective norms and ideas rooted in German ‘security culture’. However, the slow pace of 
German defence reform undermines the explanatory power of Neorealism. As Waltz notes: ‘The 
theory explains why a certain similarity of behaviour is expected from similarly situated states. 
The expected behaviour is similar, not identical. To explain the expected differences in national 
responses one would have to show how the different internal structures of states affect their 
policies and actions’. 130 Neoclassical Realism (NCR) has the potential to accommodate the 
impact of domestic variables, without sacrificing the theoretical consistency of Neorealist 
thought. NCR argues that while states of comparable material power, size and geographical 
location will exhibit military isomorphism over the long-term, they vary in their ability to 
extract resources from society on behalf of foreign and defence policy goals (‘state power’).131 
Variable state power can lead to short- to medium-term divergence with the dictates of the 
international system.132 As NCR explains the temporality of changes to national foreign, defence 
and security policies without diluting Neorealism’s premise of the independent role played by 
international structure, it should, as Rathburn notes, be thought of as the ‘logical and necessary’ 
extension of Neorealism.133 
The literature on NCR is characterised by a high-level of disagreement on the variables 
which should take priority in determining ‘state power’. NCR scholars integrate a wide array of 
variables which impact upon ‘state power’ including cognitive factors such as nationalism, 
ideology and culture and do not offer a fixed position on the relative impact of domestic 
variables endogenous or exogenous to the military.134 Legro and Moravcsik argue that the 
flexibility of NCR fosters theoretical indeterminacy: ‘If any government acting on the basis of 
geopolitical national interest, or the aims of a particular interest group, or ideationally-induced 
strategies, or misperceptions is in accord with realist theory, what plausible constraints on state 
behaviour are excluded?’135 Yet, as Rathburn highlights, states are ‘free to die’.136 NCR can 
therefore, include a focus on domestic material interests/politics as well as ideational variables, 
as long as the theory can prove that a state is ultimately punished for deviation from structural 
imperatives. In this way, NCR offers possibilities for a fruitful dialogue with cultural 
approaches, albeit by relegating culture to the status of an intervening variable. Hence, in their 
emphasis on the intervening role played by German strategic culture, the contributions of 
scholars such as Berger, Duffield and Maull could be accommodated within NCR.137  
However, the temporality of German defence reform can be explained through a more 
parsimonious NCR framework that focuses not on the intervening role of cultural variables, but 
on domestic material power relations which constrain the autonomy of the core executive in 
defence policy.138 In particular, NCR draws our attention to the impact of the Federal system in 
magnifying the political fall-out of base closures, due to the power of individual Laender, whose 
capacity to act as veto-players on base closures complicates the process of force downsizing.139 
The Federal System also plays an important role in decreasing the willingness of the core 
executive to make far-reaching change to capability procurement, due to presence of powerful 
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regional politicians who lobby against the cancellation of inappropriate ‘platform-based’ 
programmes which may lead to significant regional job losses.140 Furthermore, NCR also points 
to the particularly close linkages between social and budgetary policy in Germany in the form of 
the system of Zivildienst whereby 80-130,000 men per year undertake social work at a third of 
the cost of professionals. 141  However, as NCR predicts, when, following deployment in 
Afghanistan, compelling evidence emerged of the threat to deployability posed by stasis on 
conscription, it was quickly dropped from the CDU/CSU party programmes.142 Finally, German 
public opinion is sensitive to the development of a more assertive and aggressive military 
doctrine and rules of engagement. However, it is a little simplistic to locate this sensitivity 
solely within the German security culture and the ‘culture of anti-militarism’ that took root 
during the post-war era. To do so neglects the malleability of culture that is as much a resource 
as it is a constraint in the mobilisation of society on behalf of defence, foreign and security 
policy goals.143 As Morgenthau reminds us, ideas and ideology can act as ‘false front behinds 
which the element of power, inherent in all politics, can be concealed’.144 
 Drawing upon Oakshott’s concept of ‘character’ in European politics, Hyde-Price argues 
that when a state is subject to particular systemic imperatives for a prolonged period of time, 
they create ‘channels’ in which political activity resides.145 During the Cold War German 
defence and security policy was characterised anti-militarism and multilateralism.146 These 
principles were a rational response to Germany’s post-war security environment. The 
restrictions on German sovereignty following the Second World War placed strict limits on 
German freedom of action, restricting the Bundeswehr to the defence of German territory. Anti-
militarism and the framing of German defence and security policy firmly within the UN and 
NATO were also an essential means with which to manage German rehabilitation into the 
international community and ensure regional and international support for German 
reunification.147  
By the fall of Communism, these twin imperatives had fostered ‘channels’ of political 
activity which were characterised by a significant measure of ossification. However, the post-
Cold War era presented new imperatives, in particular the deployment of high-intensity 
expeditionary military force under shifting coalitions of the willing. As a consequence, the 
narratives which were used to frame German adherence to the dictates of international structure 
during the Cold War required significant refashioning. Yet, while the British and French unitary 
political systems provide substantial windows of opportunity to take unpopular decision about 
the overseas troop deployment and to make fundamental changes to long-standing tenets of their 
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security policies, regular elections at the Land level complicate the process of reshaping the 
narratives underpinning German defence and security policy.148 German policy makers were 
therefore forced to undertake a ‘salami-slicing’ approach to redefining the role of military power 
in German defence policy that involved regular, but limited changes to policy.149 
Within this restrictive context of low executive autonomy, German Defence Ministers 
attempted to manage the timing of German defence reforms.150 Many figures within the BMVg, 
particularly those associated with the conduct and planning of military operations, opposed the 
status quo and were privately highly-dissatisfied with the tardiness of changes to German 
defence policy objectives, military capabilities, force structures and doctrines.151 However, their 
dynamism was dampened by the civilian leadership who sought close control of the scope and 
pace of military transformation.152  Promotion within the BMVg was closely tied to the 
willingness to support the temporal management of reform. Outspoken figures who sought to 
increase the pace at which the Bundeswehr was converging with the dictates of the operational 
environment were marginalised.153 It is therefore possible to construct a compelling NCR 
account of the temporality of German defence reform without recourse to the role of culture as 
an intervening variable. Instead the complexities of policy implementation within a ‘negotiation’ 
democracy, have led to the temporal management of defence reform by the core executive and 
to slow changes to defence policy objectives, force structures, capability procurement and 
doctrine.154  
 
Conclusions: Military Adaptation and Civil-Military Relations in Defence Planning 
 
While the article challenges the findings of cultural approaches to German defence reform, it 
also identifies a set of theoretical and empirical research questions which require further 
attention. The capacity of European militaries to adapt to operational environments is a vital, yet 
under-explored issue. Furthermore, as Farrell notes, the theoretical literature on the sources of 
military change fails to adequately account for the role of ‘bottom-up’ military adaptation.155 
This preoccupation with ‘top-down’ civilian-led military change is evident in scholarship on 
German defence policy that focuses on the exogenous impact of strategic culture, international 
structure or executive autonomy. In its focus on the independent impact of international 
structure and the intervening impact of executive autonomy, NCR provides a strong measure of 
analytical leverage in understanding the key variables exogenous to the military which 
determine military adaptability. There is, however, a requirement for further research on the 
intervening impact of variables endogenous to the military in determining the ‘organisational 
capabilities’156 of the Bundeswehr and other European militaries to adapt force structures, 
capabilities and doctrines to operational requirements. Organisation theory in particular has the 
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potential to deliver significant new insights into European military adaptation, but has received 
relatively little attention in scholarship on post-Cold War European defence reform.157  
The article also draws attention to the need for a stronger focus on the interrelated issue 
of civil-military relations158 in defence planning. The appropriate balance that should be struck 
between ‘top-down’ civilian and ‘bottom-up’ military input to effective military adaptation is an 
enduring question in the study of democratic states. The principle of civilian control is 
paramount within democracies: militaries should advise on, but not formulate policy. 159 
Nevertheless, defence planning should not be dominated by civilians. The necessity for military 
autonomy, particularly in doctrinal development, is captured by Huntington. Drawing upon the 
insights of Clausewitz that war is an autonomous science, yet also subordinate to political 
purposes, Huntington noted: ‘The fact that war has its own grammar requires that the military 
professionals be permitted to develop their expertise at this grammar without extraneous 
interference’.160 As the article has highlighted, tactical and operational-level decisions on 
German military doctrine have been subject to a particularly high-level of civilian interference 
that has undermined the Bundeswehr’s capacity to develop expertise in the ‘grammar of war’. At 
the same time, strategic-level questions of force structures and capability procurement have been 
dominated by military input and clouded by inter-service rivalry. Civil-military relations in 
defence planning is a vital issue in the effective generation of military power, yet there are no 
comparative accounts of post-Cold War European civil-military relations in defence planning.161 
This forms a second critical avenue for future research on German and European defence reform.       
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